Vice or Virtue? Exploring the Dichotomy of an Offensive Security Engineer and Government “Hack Back” Policies by Withers, Kim et al.
Vice or Virtue? Exploring the Dichotomy of an Offensive Security Engineer 
and Government “Hack Back” Policies 
 
 
Kim L. Withers 
Nova Southeastern University 
kw954@mynsu.nova.edu 
James L. Parrish 
University of North Texas 
james.parrish@unt.edu 
James N. Smith 
Augusta University 
jasmith8@augusta.edu 
Timothy J. Ellis 
Nova Southeastern University 
ellist@nova.edu 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In response to increasing cybersecurity threats, 
government and private agencies have increasingly 
hired offensive security experts: "red-hat” hackers. 
They differ from the better-known “white-hat” 
hackers in applying the methods of cybercriminals 
against cybercriminals and counter or preemptively 
attacking, rather than focusing on defending against 
attacks. Often considered the vigilantes of the hacker 
ecosystem, they work under the same rules as would 
be hackers, attackers, hacktivists, organized cyber-
criminals, and state-sponsored attackers—which can 
easily lead them into the unethical practices often 
associated with such groups. Utilizing the virtue 
(ethics) theory and cyber attribution, we argue that 
there exists a dichotomy among offensive security 
engineers, one that appreciates organizational 
security practices, but at the same time violates ethics 
in how to retaliate against a malicious attacker. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Currently, there is a hacker attack every 39 
seconds, affecting one in three Americans each year 
[10]. As the Internet penetrates more deeply into 
people’s daily lives, the vectors of attack for 
cybercriminals and hackers will continue to multiply, 
and, as Internet use continues to expand, the total 
number of cyber-attacks grows annually and the 
potential damage from cyber-attacks also increases. 
According to Gartner, the consistent rise of 
cybercrime has amplified information security 
spending to more than $86.4 billion in 2017 [36]. That 
value does not include an accounting of the Internet of 
Things (IoT), industrial control systems (ICS), 
automotive security, and other cybersecurity 
categories. According to a Cryptologic Program 
budget analysis, the intelligence community invested 
roughly one-third of the total cyber-operations budget 
of roughly $1.02 billion on defense of military and 
other classified computer networks against foreign 
attacks in fiscal year 2013 [17]. Though economic 
calculations vary extensively and are difficult to make, 
cybercrime and data loss have been estimated to cost 
the global economy at least $1 trillion annually [12]. 
A generalized definition of cybercrime may be 
“unlawful acts wherein the computer is either a tool or 
target or both” (as cited in [5], p. 141). But those who 
commit cybercrimes may have different motivations 
from those who initiate cyber-attacks. 
Cyber-attacks have the potential to cause 
substantial and wide-ranging harm across a number of 
critical arenas. These targeted attacks against nuclear 
infrastructure, such as Stuxnet [6]; attacks against 
commercial entities, such as the Sony hack [19]; 
attacks against government infrastructure, such as the 
Estonia DDoS attack [37]; and attacks against political 
entities, such as the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) hack [23]. Cutting-edge spyware or malware is 
likely to be found on the computers of senior 
government officials or on important network systems 
within national critical infrastructures. Governments, 
corporations, and individuals have prudently 
responded to these cybercrime trends by hardening 
their cyber defenses. For instance, shortly after the 
Sony Pictures hacks, the United States and the United 
Kingdom announced a series of “cyber war games” to 
prepare their government agencies for the potential of 
broad-based cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, 
including the banking and financial sector (BBC News, 
2015). War has both defensive and offensive aspects, 
both in real space and in cyber war. U.S. agencies 
define offensive cyber operations as activities 
intended “to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers or computer 
networks, or the computers and networks themselves,” 
according to the Offensive Cyber Effects Operations 
(OCEO) presidential directive in 2012. The 
government employs several hackers to carry out 
offensive actions against cyber adversaries 
internationally. Too much emphasis is placed on 
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offensive retaliation by these hackers. Over-
concentrating on offense can be dangerous and 
destabilizing because it encourages offensive actors to 
attack first and ferociously before an adversary can 
[34]. 
The term hacking has evolved over the years, but 
in general, it refers to the use of a computer to gain 
unauthorized access to information systems or to 
exploit the weaknesses of computer networks [21]. 
“Hacker” can mean either someone who compromises 
computer security or a skilled developer in the free or 
open-source software movements [22]. Hacks are 
deployed for various reasons as diverse as the thrill of 
the conquest, protests, profit, and bolstering status 
within the hacker community. Notably, hackers are not 
inherently bad, nor does the word “hacker” 
definitively mean “criminal.” 
Offensive security engineers are known as “red 
hat” hackers, who use hacking techniques to perform 
their job functions. (This is as opposed to “white-hat” 
hackers, who work primarily defensively, and “black-
hat” hackers, who act maliciously). Red hats are 
considered the vigilantes of the hacker community 
when responding to cyber attribution. For several 
years, the U.S. military has employed offensive 
security engineers to attack cyber adversaries using 
potent cyber weapons or cyber tools that can break into 
enemy computers [18]. Offensive security techniques 
have since spread to business communities and social 
media platforms such as Facebook. Demand continues 
to grow in government and industry circles for 
engineers with offensive skills and ever-more-
sophisticated cyber tools, including malicious 
software with such destructive potential as to qualify 
as cyberweapons implanted in an enemy's network 
[18]. 
 Despite all of the security countermeasures 
implemented by security practitioners, the protection 
of data and other asset security is an ongoing process 
with no winners. As their work continues to evolve, 
offensive security engineers must know and adhere to 
the ethical practices of an organization so that the 
appropriate security policies are upheld, preventing 
illegitimate access. Yet, at the same time, they may 
easily succumb to their hacker vices when presented 
with an adversarial attack situation. This article 
investigates the ethical dichotomy of offensive 
security engineers, employing virtue (ethics) theory 
and cyber attribution. Therefore, answers were sought 
to the following specific research question: 
 
Do offensive security engineers or hackers find it 
unethical to retaliate against nation-state actors? 
  
 
2. Contribution to Information Systems 
 
Modern threats — such as worms, viruses, 
phishing, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and botnets 
— underscore the need for offensive security research 
in an increasingly networked and computer-reliant 
society.  Responses to these cyber threats vary from 
passive observation to the legal right to defend 
computer systems using aggressive countermeasures 
[14]. Such Internet security research is itself at one 
extreme of a broad spectrum of computer security 
research. We propose, however, that the information 
systems (IS) field should incorporate features of 
offensive security research which will require 
organizations to enable continued growth of the field. 
 
3. Offensive Security Background 
 
Currently, there are different authorities and rules 
of engagement for offensive as opposed to defensive 
cyber security. Offense involves exploiting systems, 
penetrating systems with cyber-attacks, and generally 
leveraging broken software to compromise entire 
systems and systems of systems [32]. Conversely, 
defense means building secure software, designing 
and engineering systems to be secure in the first place, 
and creating incentives and rewards for systems that 
are built to be secure [33]. Ultimately, offensive 
security is a proactive and adversarial approach to 
protecting computer systems, networks, and 
individuals from attacks.  
A major revelation of offensive security practices 
came with the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010, a 
computer sabotage operation reportedly conducted by 
the United States and Israel to destroy machines used 
in Iran's nuclear program. Stuxnet is a large, complex 
piece of malware with many different components and 
functionalities, written to target an industrial control 
system (ICS) or set of similar systems [15], such as 
those used in gas pipelines and power plants. Stuxnet 
is estimated to have infected 50,000 to 100,000 
computers, mostly in Iran, India, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan [6] — unstable areas prior to possible cyber-
prompted disruptions. 
Moreover, U.S. intelligence agencies initiated 231 
offensive cyber operations in 2011, nearly three-
quarters of them against key targets such as Iran, 
Russia, China, and North Korea, some intended to 
disrupt nuclear proliferation [17]. This included 
placing covert implants in more than 80,000 machines 
around the world. And they are not alone; China and 
Russia are regarded as the most challenging cyber 
threats to the United States. U.S. intelligence has come 
to believe that China’s state-employed hackers by day 
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return to work at night for personal profit, stealing 
valuable U.S. defense industry secrets and selling 
them [17] — so, threats are clearly present and must 
be addressed.  
President Obama’s directive on cyber-operations 
stated that military cyber-operations resulting in the 
disruption, destruction, or manipulation of computers 
must be approved by the president [38]. This specific 
directive is known as Presidential Policy Directive-20, 
or PPD-20, focuses on cybersecurity as a top priority. 
The policy considers the evolution of cyber threats to 
the growing U.S. infrastructure, establishing 
principles and processes for the use of cyber 
operations so that cyber tools are integrated with the 
full array of national security tools. Relevant portions 
of PPD-20 include a restriction in type: 
 
“Operations and related programs or activities — 
other than network defense, cyber collection, or 
DCEO — conducted by or on behalf of the United 
States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are 
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside 
United States Government networks.” 
 
They also offer some sense of the emergent nature of 
cyberthreats: 
 
“Offensive Cyber Effects Operations OCEO can 
offer unique and unconventional capabilities to 
advance U.S. national objectives around the world 
with little or no warning to the adversary or target and 
with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely 
damaging. The development and sustainment of 
OCEO capabilities, however, may require 
considerable time and effort if access and tools for a 
specific target do not already exist.”  
 
They further offer something of a mission statement: 
 
“The United States Government shall identify 
potential targets of national importance where OCEO 
can offer a favorable balance of effectiveness and risk 
as compared with other instruments of national power, 
establish and maintain OCEO capabilities integrated 
as appropriate with other U.S. offensive capabilities, 
and execute those capabilities in a manner consistent 
with the provisions of this directive.” 
 
Political science literature argues that military 
entities — such as those addressed by PPD-20 — are 
more prone to favor offensive operations than other 
kinds of bureaucracies [50]. Early evidence suggests 
that this “cult of the offensive” operates regarding 
cyber warfare. For example, James Cartwright, the 
former Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, called for the United States to engage in more 
offensive cyber operations, and reportedly created a 
bureaucracy to that end [44]. And while government 
agencies, such as the U.S. National Security Agency 
(NSA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
the Defense Department's Cyber Command are 
responsible for defending government networks using 
offensive techniques, private companies are largely 
left to defend themselves on their own. In the wake of 
enormous cyberattacks on such companies as Uber, 
Equifax, Yahoo, and Sony, and the theft of e-mails 
from the DNC’s server, some members of Congress 
are trying to pass a significant revision of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [41].  
The bipartisan bill, known as the Active Cyber 
Defense Certainty Act (ACDCA), gives individuals 
and companies the legal authority to take action on 
networks, servers, and other infrastructures they do not 
own to establish attribution of an attack, disrupt an 
ongoing attack, and monitor the attacker. The bill 
proposes “to provide a defense to prosecution for fraud 
and related activity in connection with computers for 
persons defending against unauthorized intrusions into 
their computers.” The majority of hacking incidents 
involve groups or nation-states that attack from servers 
outside of the United States — and outside the 
jurisdiction of the ACDCA legislation. Ultimately, the 
ACDCA wants to enable broader active cyber defense 
abilities to the private sector. Government 
legislation could make similar instances of collateral 
damage more common.  
Some experts acknowledged that many companies 
already are pursuing attackers in ways that could be 
considered violations of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1986. The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1986 prohibits anyone from “knowingly” 
accessing a computer “without authorization.” The 
changes would permit companies, and private citizens, 
that are victims of cybercrimes to “hack-back,” also 
referred to as active-defense [20]. It is essential for our 
society to be prepared and for businesses and 
governments to be ahead of the attackers and other 
actors with malicious intents. But this presents 
difficulties. 
 
4. Offensive Cyber Attribution 
 
Law enforcement and military authorities seeking 
to check malicious cyber activity face a fundamental 
challenge: the “attribution problem” [43]. This entails 
the task of identifying the author of a cyber-attack or 
cyber-exploitation. The attribution problem permeates 
the cybersecurity literature. Rid & Buchanan [39] 
noted that “the attribution debate is evolving 
surprisingly slowly,” with an excessive focus on 
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technical forensics. They argued that attribution is not 
impossible for the defender, because even the most 
sophisticated attackers ultimately make mistakes, but 
it is difficult and resource-intensive, requiring 
specialized skills and substantial time invested. 
Moreover, a clever adversary can mask its tracks by 
routing attacks or exploitations through anonymizing 
computers around the globe. 
Attributing a cyber operation through common 
techniques such as technical forensics, as well as other 
intelligence sources and situational context [3], 
reverse-engineering [7], source tracking [29], 
honeypots [48], and sink-holing [4] can prove 
difficult. Sometimes traceback and related forensic 
tools can provide adequate attribution. Human and 
other forms of intelligence-gathering can further aid in 
cyber attribution. The difficulty of this problem stems 
not only from the amount of effort required to find 
forensic clues, but also the ease with which an attacker 
can embed false clues to mislead security 
professionals [43]. Without sufficient attribution, it is 
not possible to enforce policy, law, or pacts to support 
business and government objectives. The inability to 
enforce laws makes creating new ones meaningless 
and gives malicious attackers little motivation to 
behave. Additionally, distinguishing between state-
sponsored and private attacks has been under debate 
for years, making criteria for state responsibility 
unsettled. There are growing calls to deal with the 
cyber-attribution problem by making a nation 
responsible for all cyber-attacks that emerge from 
within its borders, even if the attacks are not sponsored 
by that nation [8]. Such calls increase the impetus to 
gain control of the online environment and on those 
who will act badly within it. 
Foreign intelligence organizations are constantly 
trying to break into the networks that undergird U.S. 
military operations. Amid all this, military 
organizations have noted the success of cyber 
attackers in damaging computer systems and have 
hoped to use these same techniques or “exploits” for 
military advantage, much as they seek a wide variety 
of ways to gain advantage in warfare [11].  This is 
accomplished by employing offensive security 
engineers in the fight against cyber attribution using 
offensive techniques. The United States promotes its 
cyber warriors as the best at offense, with the 
capability of using cyberweapons against their 
adversaries [9], cyberweapons that can be launched or 
controlled either externally, from another computer or 
the Internet, or internally, by spies and saboteurs [25]. 
The goal of using cyberweapons is to take control of a 
system without the knowledge of the system's owner 
so it can be used for the offensive engineer’s purposes, 
called “rootkits” [26]. Sets of such remotely controlled 
computers can be used to create “botnets,” networks 
of computers gathered under the control of a single 
user [1]. Hacker botnets have been used for monetary 
gain by sending spam or phishing email from the slave 
computers, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against 
organizations, sending ransomware to blackmail 
organizations by threatening malicious mischief, and 
engaging in cyber-espionage. Botnets developed for 
military purposes could stop an adversary’s military 
from communicating or fully deploying its weapon 
systems, making their development attractive. 
The DHS, NSA and Cyber Command’s strategy 
for recruiting hackers relies, in part, on appeals to 
malice and mischievousness: at security conferences 
(e.g., Black Hat, DEFCON, B-Sides), agency 
representatives often pitch prospective applicants by 
promising work that might otherwise land them in 
prison. These recruiters often describe the job function 
as an “ethical hacker” or “white hat.” Some security 
experts question whether the term “ethical hacker” is 
a contradiction in terms, as hacking was originally 
defined as a criminal activity and still carries that 
resonance. Conrad Constantine, a security research 
engineer at AlienVault, stated “The term ‘ethical’ is 
unnecessary – it is not logical to refer to a hacker as an 
‘ethical hacker’ because they have moved over from 
the ‘dark side’ into ‘the light’… The reason companies 
want to employ a hacker is not because they know the 
‘rules’ to hacking, but because of the very fact that 
they do not play by the rules” (as cited in [2], p. 66). It 
is prudent to suspect that prior unprofessional hacking 
conduct eventually may overflow into official job 
duties. Few have mastered the rare art of maintaining 
multiple dispositions. Maintaining ethical standards 
for red-hat hackers, then, becomes an important 
concern. 
 
5. Vice versus Virtue 
 
Fieser [16] noted that, “The field of ethics (or 
moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, 
and recommending concepts of right and wrong 
behavior” [16]. Normative ethics is a subfield that 
seeks to develop a set of morals or guiding principles 
to influence the conduct of individuals and groups 
within a population (e.g., professional, religious, or 
societal). Virtue ethics are currently one of three major 
approaches in normative ethics. In it, virtues are values 
behind ethical actions or principles behind codes of 
conduct, moral properties that people use to act 
ethically. Human nature, social norms, and workplace 
culture generally pull one toward virtues. Vice, then, 
is simply a deficiency or excess of virtue; virtue and 
vice are not exclusive or binary, but exist on continua 
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with one another, with virtue generally implying or 
even containing vice [30]. 
Some hackers who formerly engaged in thrill-
seeking computer crimes are now assisting or 
employed by governments and companies to establish 
and maintain security practices by testing system 
vulnerability with their own specialized knowledge, 
thus helping to foil the activities of “black hat” 
malevolent cyber-attackers. This raises some ethical 
issues, particularly the question of whether such 
offensive hackers emphasize computer security as a 
professional virtue or whether they hack as a socially 
legitimatized vice. Hackers often discuss their 
motivations for hacking. These are sometimes 
characterized as self-justifications, as explanations, or 
as agonized struggles with personal obsessions and 
failures [24]. Additionally, hackers often confess to an 
addiction to computers or computer networks, a 
feeling that they are compelled to hack. The 
motivations offered by perhaps the most famous of all 
hackers, Kevin Mitnick, provides a common 
articulation of motivations for hacking [24]: 
 
 “You get a better understanding of cyberspace, the 
computer systems, the operating systems, how the 
computer systems interact with one another, that 
basically was my motivation behind my hacking 
activity in the past. It was just from the gain of 
knowledge and the thrill of adventure, nothing that 
was well and truly sinister as trying to get any type of 
monetary gain or anything.” 
 
In response to this dilemma, it could be argued that 
hackers have an ethic or ethos (Greek meaning 
custom, habit, character, or disposition) that is 
grounded in the ethical use of computers. There is 
evidence of such an ethic, which is not imposed by 
organizational codes of conduct [40], but is based on 
an intrinsic set of values and beliefs, inspired by an 
inherent respect for computers and the information 
they contain — and the cyber-attribution of those who 
do not share this respect. For example, some hackers 
have spent large amounts of their own time, for no 
apparent financial gain, in obsessively tracking down 
malicious cyber-attackers and bringing them to 
account for the damage they have caused, not only to 
organizations, but to the ethos of the former hacking 
community [45, 46]. But while the hacker ethic in 
response to cyber-attribution is one of exploration and 
retaliation without thought of virtue or consequences, 
tolerance of cyber-retaliation has changed over time, 
since threats and cyber harm have become more 
serious [28]. Thus, again, the ethical postures of those 
who would undertake offensive cybersecurity 
activities is a matter of concern for individuals, 
companies, and nations. 
 
6. Methodology 
 
A quantitative survey and descriptive statistics 
were adopted for this study. Data was collected 
through self-reporting using convenience sampling. 
This study focused primarily on offensive security 
engineers as the population being studied. Offensive 
security engineers are individuals that use hacking 
techniques to perform their jobs. Because the study 
was intended to reach a difficult demographic to 
survey, a “thank you” splash page at the end of the 
survey asked subjects to recommend friends to the 
survey, creating a self-perpetuating sample in 
accordance with the process of the snowball sampling 
technique. 
In accordance with previously cited literature on 
hackers and computer security, the authors developed 
a survey instrument from the collection of preceding 
literature and articles. For the purpose of the survey 
design and data analysis, the authors organized 
questions that would be non-intrusive to the target 
population of offensive security engineers and 
hackers. 
The research setting is non-contrived because 
participants used their computers or mobile devices to 
take the web-based survey. In addition to a web-based 
survey link, quick response (QR) codes were 
distributed electronically via LinkedIn groups and 
Twitter hacker communities.  
A 12-item survey was developed and implemented 
using a Survey Monkey form. The survey included 10 
questions that captured the perceptions of the “hack 
back” initiatives and ethical interpretations. Therefore, 
this survey seeks to gain feedback from offensive 
security engineers, red/black teams, or other hackers 
responsible for pursuing attackers as a key part of their 
job function. 
Survey responses were analyzed using frequency 
analysis and Pearson’s Chi-square (p < .05) and 
categorical analysis among demographic variables.  
 
6.1 Participants 
 
The final dataset for statistical analyses included 
123 respondents. Of the 123 respondents, 115 (93.5%) 
were men and eight (6.5%) were women; the majority 
of the respondents were between the ages of 35 and 44 
years (35.77%). Demographic statistics are displayed 
in Table 1. 
Gender and age are often used in the reporting of 
demographic data; however, previous studies have 
varied in their use for examining statistical 
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differences. Researchers, Mensch and Wilkie [35] 
found differences in security attitude between men and 
women. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Demographics (Age and Gender) 
 
 
Table 2: Survey Questions ( Frequency and Category Analysis) 
Note: When p < .05 at significance level, items are non-significant, as denoted with (NS).
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7. Results 
 
As shown in Table 1, more males than females 
participated in the survey. Research for this study and 
literature on hackers has not uncovered any significant 
evidence of female hackers [49]. This imbalance is 
disproportionate even in the field of computer-
mediated technologies [47]. A number of factors 
explain the paucity of women generally in the 
computer sciences: childhood socialization, where 
boys are taught to relate to technology more easily 
than girls; education in computers occurs in a 
masculine environment; and a gender bias toward men 
in the language used in computer science [47, 49]. 
Table 2  presents the frequency and categorical 
analyses of survey responses by the respondents. The 
following discussion examines the frequency analysis 
for each table first followed by the categorical 
analysis. 
 
7.1 Frequency Analysis 
 
The survey contained 10 questions designed to 
assess how offensive security engineers or hackers 
report their own vices from a security perspective 
(Table 2). The questions were worded not to insinuate 
a hacker’s vice. The available responses to these 
questions were in a “Strongly Agree to Strongly 
Disagree” 5-point Likert scale format.  
Of the 123 respondents, 57.7% (strongly agree, 
n=71) and 30.1% (agree, n=37) had knowledge of the 
terms “active cyber defense” or “hack back.”  Also, 
26.8% (strongly agree, n=33) and 26% (agree, n=32) 
said that they find satisfaction in offensively 
mitigating attacks, while 23.6% (strongly agree, n=29) 
and 26.8% (agree, n=33) self-reported that private 
companies should be allowed to “hack back” their 
adversaries. Additionally, 35% (strongly disagree, 
n=43) and 31.7% (disagree, n=39) self-reported that 
they do not find it unethical to pursue adversaries in 
foreign countries. Further, 21.1% (strongly agree, 
n=26) and 24.4% (agree, n=30) self-reported that there 
should be no prosecution for anyone who defends 
against foreign adversaries. In regard to motive, 28.5% 
(strongly agree, n=35) and 31.7% (agree, n=39) 
reported that they enjoy hacking and creating new 
offensive techniques or tools. Surprisingly, 43.1% 
(n=53) did not agree or disagree with whether they 
were torn between company ethics and performing 
offensive job functions.  
When summing the responses for questions Q2 and 
Q10 respectively, 47.9% (n=59) of respondents 
reported that it is not part of their job function to “hack 
back” adversaries. On the other hand, 39.8% (n=49) 
reported that they would protect their network at all 
costs and 32.5% neither agreed nor disagreed. 
 
7.2 Categorical Analysis 
 
In addition to the descriptive measures reported 
above in Table 2, categorical analysis was done on 
demographic data in the study. The variables used 
were gender and age group. No predictions were made 
on these variables; the study was exploratory. 
Table 2 contains Pearson’s chi-squared statistics 
for each of the demographic variables. The only 
variable with more than one significant result was 
gender. Males responded more frequently (n=115) 
than  females (n=8) and differently on all questions (p< 
.05). Thus, we present the following analysis: 
One significant difference was found for each of 
the age and gender variables. For age under Q10, “I 
will protect my company network from attackers at 
any cost,” more respondents between the ages of 25 
and 34 would protect their company network from 
foreign adversaries no matter the cost. The significant 
result was p=.016. On one hand, this may not be 
surprising — one might expect this age range to be 
quicker to attack their adversaries. Although the 
Pearson’s chi-squared was p=.051 and not significant 
for Q3, it is still worthy to mention that more males 
find satisfaction in offensively protecting their 
company’s network. Finally, for gender significance 
in Q1, “I am familiar with the industry terms ‘active 
cyber defense’ or ‘hack back,’ more males understood 
the terms (p=.002) presented in Q1. Among all 
respondents, only one female had never heard of the 
terms. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
It is fair to conclude that the research question was 
answered. Based on the respondent’s self-report, we 
found that the majority do not find it unethical to “hack 
back” adversaries in nation-states and that private 
companies should be given the right to retaliate 
without prosecution. Additionally, based on the 
frequency analysis, there appears to exist a dichotomy 
of vice versus virtue among offensive security 
engineers. A few of the questions elicited a high 
percentage of undecided (neither agree nor disagree) 
responses; this alludes to such a dichotomy. 
As cybercrime continues to be an increasing and 
evolving threat, attention must turn toward long-term 
solutions. Simply blocking these attacks does not do 
so, but instead allows cybercriminals to improve their 
attacks, which is relatively easy to do in the current 
environment. Attribution is one of the most promising 
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ways to increase the risks associated with performing 
cybercrime, and therefore provide a way to reduce the 
frequency of cybercrime. 
Most public discussion has centered on defense 
against cyberattacks on governmental, military, and 
economic concerns. Cyber activities can have 
defensive or offensive purposes. Defensive cyber 
activities include upgrading or restoring a computer 
system that has been damaged, investigating damage 
in the computer system, and maintaining situational 
awareness of computer systems and networks. 
Offensive cyber activities are the insertion of 
computer programs into an attacker’s computer 
system to observe and collect transmitted information; 
the disruption, degradation, or destruction of the 
software of a system; the destruction of the hardware 
of a system; and the manipulation of a computer 
system to use it to cause further damage [42]. 
The hiring point for the government and most 
businesses is that hackers have considerable skillsets 
and knowledge about telecommunications, data 
security, operating systems, programming languages, 
networks, and cryptography as opposed to less skilled 
security professionals. Hackers are being employed to 
perform such offensive cyber activities. The offensive 
or red-hat hackers who have developed their unique 
skills by breaking into company and government 
systems are now being employed for purposes of 
offensive security against their former colleagues. The 
hacker ethos for securing computer systems is soon 
overshadowed by the vice of hacking for the thrill of 
it. The “attribution problem” will have consequences, 
requiring offensive hackers to identify and retaliate 
against attackers on domestic and foreign soil, 
rejecting state toleration of such cyber-adversaries. 
In today’s ever-evolving cyber threat landscape 
where cyber attackers are constantly searching for new 
ways to circumvent existing security and legislative 
controls to commit cybercriminal activities, it is 
essential for offensive hackers to possess current 
knowledge, skills, and experiences. It is unrealistic to 
expect that government agencies have all the cyber 
security expertise required in securing the nation’s 
critical infrastructures. Therefore the “hack-back” 
initiative is slowly gaining momentum to legalize 
cyber-retaliation methods among businesses, currently 
prohibited by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
  
9. Future Research 
 
The paper as a whole is more interested in laying 
out the problem and its scope than in actually 
addressing the problem. Context is essential, to be 
sure, but the argument can be made that the possibility 
of vice overwhelming virtue among red-hat hackers 
and the ongoing concerns with cyber attribution 
present significant risks for the conduct of offensive 
cybersecurity activities, and that this issue needs to be 
given more attention (and space) than it currently 
receives. 
The main limitations to this research are: (1) 
offensive hacker perceptions were measured as 
opposed to their actual behavior, and (2) the 
generalizability of the study is limited because the 
target participants only included offensive security 
engineers and hackers from a small population. The 
sample was unselected and is unlikely to contain many 
high-rate hackers. Future research might be usefully 
conducted in other hacker communities or conferences 
(i.e. Black Hat or DEFCON). 
Therefore, one goal of future research would be to 
demonstrate through more behavioral 
evidence/attestation whether or not vice does 
overwhelm. Future investigations should consider 
developing a survey instrument, based on prior 
research, to measure the virtues and vices of offensive 
security professionals. The research would also 
possibly address philosophical systems that argue that 
vice inevitably wins out; these philosophies may 
provide a useful perspective on the general issue. 
Given that many hackers perceive themselves as 
libertarian or even Randian, those ideologies also may 
need to be investigated as a starting point for this work. 
Further discussions in the information security 
field should be about the issue of trust. Some security 
professionals are opposed to hiring hackers for 
security work. Dr. Eugene Spafford of Purdue 
University is quoted as saying, “Do not do business 
with any company that hires a convicted hacker to 
work in the security area. …This is like having a 
known arsonist install a fire alarm.” Those entities that 
do hire hackers overlook their potential for engaging 
in vice and hire them based on an extensive 
background check and assumption that they will 
perform their job functions and not violate the 
organization’s trust or the trust of their clients.  Most 
hired hackers do not misuse their power as they know 
they are being trusted with something important, and 
they want to live up to that trust. There are differing 
beliefs throughout the information technology 
community that favor both sides of the discussion. 
However, the importance of cybersecurity differs 
based on the differing focuses of the individual 
organizations. This also could be a topic of future 
research. 
To stay ahead of its adversaries, the United States 
must constantly adjust and improve its cyber offenses 
and defenses. The U.S. government’s ability to defend 
its networks always lags behind its adversaries’ ability 
to exploit critical infrastructure’s weaknesses. 
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Classifications of critical infrastructures vary across 
countries, but are united by the thought that the 
relevant asset must be “vital” to count as critical. DHS 
states that, “Critical infrastructure are the assets, 
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination thereof.” It is 
unclear whether additional vulnerabilities are 
introduced to the critical infrastructure by performing 
offensive techniques or whether this is an underlying 
concern of the government. Further research may dive 
deeper into this question. 
To date it has proven difficult to define clear rules 
of engagement for responding to cyberattacks. These 
rules of engagement will first have to assist in 
distinguishing among the exploits of a mere hacker, 
criminal activity (such as fraud or theft), espionage, or 
an attack by a foreign government entity [31]. The 
rules will need to describe or at least suggest what is 
necessary, appropriate, relative, and justified in each 
particular case, based on relevant domestic and 
international laws. Therefore, policy structures and 
ethics of offensive security techniques would be worth 
examining in future research.  
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